Do the Mobilized Mobilize? Experimental Evidence from Civil Society Leaders in Guatemala.

(With Agnes Cornell and Marcia Grimes). Working paper.

Recommended citation: First generation policy approaches to curbing corruption attributed a central role to citizens in detecting malfeasance and demanding better government performance. Such social accountability initiatives rest on the assumption that, when provided with credible information, citizens will monitor government behavior and hold public officials accountable. A growing body of evidence challenges this assumption, showing that citizens frequently remain disengaged—even when presented with information about corruption. Explanations for these null findings point to citizens’ prior beliefs, limited political efficacy, or the collective action challenges inherent in accountability efforts. We extend this line of inquiry to a more engaged population: local civil society organization (CSO) leaders. Employing a survey experiment with CSO leaders in Guatemala, we find that exposure to information about procurement-related corruption does not affect their intentions to monitor or protest. Our findings suggest that even among civically active actors, corruption information alone is insufficient to trigger accountability engagement.