The Market in Smugglers: Survey Experimental Evidence on the Choice of Coyotes in Guatemala

(With Mateo Villamizar and Erik Wibbels).

Comparative Political Studies, Forthcoming.

Recommended citation: Illicit migration is big business, involving millions of migrants each year, many of whom hire human smugglers to facilitate perilous journeys. Yet little is known about this illicit market or how potential migrants choose whom to hire. Facing high costs and uncertain prospects of success, future migrants must make complex, high-stakes decisions when selecting a smuggler. In this paper, we provide descriptive evidence on the market for coyotes (human smugglers in Latin America) and experimental evidence on the factors shaping hiring preferences. Using a forced-choice conjoint experiment, we isolate the effects of referrals, reputation, reliability, safety, and price. Our evidence draws on three original sources: a panel survey of deportees from the U.S. to Guatemala, a household survey, and in-depth interviews. We find that referrals and reputations for safe, successful journeys are central, while price has little influence—helping explain why policies that raise migration costs often fail to deter irregular migration.
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